A recent report 1 estimates that the size of global data will reach 44 zettabytes (44 billion terabytes) by 2020, a figure that would have seemed inconceivable only a decade ago. This growth is influencing the way data is being managed for highperformance computing or operations and planning analysis. Distributed systems are being constructed for large and/or dispersed data that are difficult to process with a single data-processing unit. However, continual massive data breaches show that existing security solutions are failing far too often-reports of 100 million+ user accounts compromised in a single incident are no longer surprising.
As big data, cloud computing, grid computing, and the Internet of Things reshape current data systems and practices, IT experts are keen to harness the power of distributed systems to boost security and prevent fraud. How can these systems' capabilities be used to improve processing without inflating risk?
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
In a distributed architecture, multiple data-processing systems cooperate with one another to collect, analyze, share, and secure diverse datasets (see Figure 1 ). To maximize scalability and performance, some systems run massively parallel software on many computers that might include columnar databases and other distributed management solutions, in many configurations. In general, a distributed system application has Access Control for Emerging Distributed Systems As big data, cloud computing, grid computing, and the Internet of Things reshape current data systems and practices, IT experts are keen to harness the power of distributed systems to boost security and prevent fraud. How can these systems' capabilities be used to improve processing without inflating risk?
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NIST; j.voas@ieee.org multiple interconnected but independent computers coordinating to perform a joint computation. Different computers in the system are independent, in the sense that they do not directly share memory. Instead, they communicate using messages and transfer information to one another over a network.
Enterprises want the same security capabilities for distributed systems that are in place for "nondistributed" information systems, including user authentication and authorization. However, the biggest challenge working with and leveraging technologies for distributed data is to maintain data security for sharing. The fundamental techniques to solve the data sharing problem are access control policy enforcement and management that allows organizations to share their distributed data and processes while meeting security and privacy mandates.
ACCESS CONTROL CHALLENGES OF DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Because existing distributed system models were not designed and built with access control capability in mind, 2 most cannot adequately manage the creation, use, and dissemination of distributed data and processes. Consequently, they either introduce friction into collaboration through excessively strict rules, or risk serious data loss by sharing data too permissively. 3 Authentication management, which is not directly related to data content, is generally handled by coordinated systems independently, just as with nondistributed data systems. Thus, the focus of security is on authorization, which is more complex than it is for nondistributed systems because of the need to synchronize access privileges among the coordinated systems. 4 Support for the distributed system's features complicates access control implementation, because the difficulties are in general handled by different techniques, each with its own security challenges. Unlike a traditional nondistributed system, a distributed system must not only enforce access control policies on data leaving individual cooperating systems but also control access to local resources. And depending on the sensitivity of the data, it needs to ensure that distributed applications on other coordinated systems have permission to access the data that they are processing, and deal with the access to the distributed processes and data from their local users. 
›

ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL FOR DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) 4 is well adapted for distributed system access control because it provides granular and meta attribute capabilities, Figure 1 . A distributed architecture makes it possible to scale data processing by using multiple cooperating systems.
Control system
supporting privilege assignment in a distributed framework that requires federation and autonomy control among coordinated systems (see Figure 2) . ABAC controls access to objects using rules that are evaluated with attributes of subject and object actions, and the environment relevant to a request. For example, a rule may state that access is allowed if the subject is an employee, the object is the employee's time sheet, and the environment is an office location during working hours. ABAC for distributed systems relies on attributes to not only define access control policy rules but also to enforce the access control with collaboration among cooperating processing domains. 6 Attributes can be provided by any system in the distributed environment regardless of transmission method. Such attribute providers can be the original authoritative source or an intermediary between the authoritative source and the access control functions that receives information from the authoritative source and then repackages the attributes for delivery/routing to the storage repositories of access control functions or attribute providers. Attributes are characteristics of the user (for example, consumers), the protected resource/service, or environment conditions (for example, time and location), and they contain information given by a name-value pair (for example, Department-Human Resources, Security level-5, Time-5:00 pm). Attribute values can be human generated (for example, an employee database), derived from formulas (for example, a credit score), or system generated (for example, environment conditions such as time, location, and so on). All must be defined and constrained by allowable values required by the appropriate scheme for the distributed environment. 7 Once attributes and their allowable values are defined, methods for provisioning attributes and appropriate attribute values to users and resources within a framework for storing, retrieving, updating, or revoking must be devised. Therefore, attributes need to be established, issued, stored, and managed under authorities, which provide assurance schemes via location, retrieval, publication, validation, update, modification, security, and revocation capabilities. As a result, it is important to ensure that the attributes obtained are secure and error-free regardless of the source, allowing risk-based decisions based on confidence in supplied attributes. Figure 3 illustrates the scope of attributes used by a local access control function and by remote attribute providers from the perspective of a control or cooperating system in a distributed environment. Note that the remote attributes are provisioned through remote networks. Interfaces and mechanisms must be developed or adopted to enable sharing of these attributes. 4 Successful deployment of the attributes can be achieved through five basic principles: 8, 9 › preparation considers the establishing of subject, object, and environment attributes as well as their granularity; › veracity considers the trustworthiness of attributes and their value's accuracy; › security considers attribute-atrest and attribute-in-transit security; › readiness considers the attribute refresh, synchronization, and cache mechanism; and › management considers the management attribute group, metadata, hierarchies, transformation, integration, minimization, and integration with authentication.
ATTRIBUTE CONSIDERATIONS
Privacy and security controls are also likely to be compromised due to the misconfiguration of access control policies, 10 so it is important to ensure that access control policies for each computing unit in the distributed system are coordinated. For example, distinguishing meta (global) policy from the local (cooperation) policy might be required depending on the configuration of the distributed system (for example, control versus cooperating). Thus, synchronization and federation schemes between policies rules and attributes must be established. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) controls access to objects using rules that are evaluated with attributes of subject and object actions, and the environment relevant to a request.
M
any distributed system designs have been proposed to address information availability challenges, but most focus on processing capabilities. Security considerations for protecting data are mostly ad hoc and patch efforts, and thus might not be well thought out as part of an overall security architecture. Attribute-based authorization can be a critical architectural component for protecting distributed systems and their users from insider attacks. In addition, reliable attributes can provide the requisite granularity, flexibility, and scalability for distributed access control configurations, making it finally possible to manage the risks that come with big data.
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